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## The MB Post August 14: “Rule It or Ruin It”



Wael Nawara

### Is This the End of an Era For the Muslim Brotherhood?

*"The Brotherhood rhetoric materialized into bloody scorched-earth tactics. With a “rule it or ruin it” attitude, the Brotherhood and their allies waged the most threatening assault that the Egyptian state has faced in its recent history. The Brotherhood and their supporters attacked many police stations, in some cases slaughtering every policeman on site and mutilating their bodies. Over 50 churches were attacked in a campaign which also targeted missionary schools, shops and even the homes of Christians. Government buildings, military installations, police and army personnel were also attacked. On Aug. 19., 25 police conscripts were captured in Sinai, their hands were tied and they were made to lie on the ground face down where they were machine-gunned down" [.....]*

***"In the Muslim Brotherhood's case, it was its strategic intent which had sealed the group's fate. As Egyptians watched the horrific scenes which confirmed the group's intent to destroy Egypt since they could no longer rule it, they shock their heads in utter disapproval and turned the Muslim Brotherhood's page, signaling the end of an era"***



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Nervana Mahmoud

### The Future of the Muslim Brotherhood

***"There is a possibility that they may try to divide the Egyptian army, and recruit junior cadres to create an Egyptian version of the Free Syrian army. Some Islamists even openly admitted this intention during the sit-ins. This approach may not be successful initially, but a long standoff with the army may challenge the loyalties of middle-ranking officer corps and conscripts. The Egyptian army is stretched and has already called on reserve ranks. I doubt they will succeed;** the army chief, General Sisi is still very popular within the army, he is also a very conservative Muslim that has succeeded to a large extent in forging a new national identity that counters the Islamist ideology. **Another important factor that may decide the future of the Muslim Brotherhood is their financial funding.*** Thus far, the group has had no

problems with financing, however, the group's funds have been frozen inside of Egypt and the rising hostility against the group in many Arab countries may create enough of a financial crisis to severely curtail its activities. Nonetheless, the international wings of the Muslim Brotherhood will not leave the parent group in Egypt to suffocate financially and will make every effort to help them to survive"

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### **Khaled Fahmy**

#### **The Threat to Egypt's Mighty State**

"Was the dispersion of the Rabaa sit-in done in a legal manner? Was excessive force used? Who is responsible for murdering prisoners while transporting them in a police truck? These are not academic or trivial questions. They are substantial and necessary questions that we don't have the luxury not to ask. Why? Because not posing these questions and turning a blind eye to the violations of the army and police in light of the exceptional nature of the moment effectively denies both institutions the legitimacy they claim they have to use arms. **For the legitimacy of the army and police's weapons is tied to the consent of the people, and the ability of the people to oversee these two institutions. Without this oversight, and without asking these questions in this sensitive time in particular, we will have given the green light to the army and police not only to exterminate the Muslim Brotherhood, but also to destroy society and bring down the mighty Egyptian state"**

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### **Ashraf El-Sherif**

#### **The Brotherhood's Downfall**

"It is obvious that the Brothers were never adamant about implementing any true restructuring of state institutions, or bringing about real change. What they did instead was attempt to infiltrate these establishments or create alternative structures that they could control" [.....] "After assuming power the Brotherhood committed tactical errors and engaged in zero-sum games that made their fears come true. But at what cost? The cost is grave: a great blow to the democratic process and prospects of revolutionary change."

[Part 1](#) and [Part 2](#)

## Egypt's New Draft Constitution



Zaid Al-Ali

### Egypt's Constitutional Morass

***"The entire approach to constitutional reform can be described as "anti-modern," for at least three reasons. (1) It ignores the evidence that has accumulated over decades that Egypt's existing constitutional framework is failing. Any genuine effort to turn a corner and salvage state and society will require much more than just amending minor details here and there; an entirely new framework and a new approach to the constitution is needed, but that is something that most of Egypt's mainstream politicians and most of its leading constitutional experts are not willing to even consider. (2) It ignores all the progress that has been made in other countries, including in many African countries, at precisely the same time as governance in Egypt has been regressing. Their constitutions have advanced by leaps and bounds in recent decades, while Egypt has remained static. (3) The Egyptian state's approach to constitutional reform is designed to prevent any real reform. It insists that the act of redrafting the constitution is the state's obligation and must be carried out within the context of existing state institutions. As such, the judiciary, the military, the police, universities, state sanctioned trade unions, etc. are all given a stake in the process, and their respective clout allows them to defend their territory like a series of tribes; even political parties are treated like just another institution that have interests to defend, rather than as the people's representatives. Within that context, anyone who does not have significant power within the state's existing structure, including the majority of the Egyptian population, mostly notably the weak and vulnerable who live on the margins of society, is essentially ignored"***

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Bassem Sabry

### 22 Key Points in Egypt's New Draft Constitution

*"The initial impression of this current draft is that it is a significant and substantial edit of its 2012 original, rather than a monumental and groundbreaking change. It is slightly slimmer (about 40 articles were axed, many of which were of literary rather than legal effect) and brings what could be argued as some subtle improvements from a democratic perspective. Yet it still leaves much to be desired: solidification and*

expansion of liberties, a welcome and preset electoral system and further decentralization of the Egyptian state"

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**Mai El-Sadany**

### **Highlights from the August 22nd Draft Constitution**

"The following are the main highlights from the August 22nd version of the constitutional draft (which is made up of 197 articles). Please note that this is not a full translation, nor does it attempt to be. (1) **Egypt is a member of both the Arab and Islamic nations.** (Article 1). (2) **The role of religion in the state and the role of Al-Azhar in Articles 2-4 remain unchanged, although Al-Azhar is now not allowed to interpret laws.** Additionally, Article 219 of the 2012 Constitution (on the principles of Islamic sharia) has been removed. (3) **The political system is based on a multi-party system,** the peaceful transfer of power, and separation of powers, within the framework and principles of Egyptian society. (Article 6) (4) **Egyptian nationality will be regulated by the law.** (Article 7)

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### **The Next Parliament Elections: The Need For Proportional Representation System**



**Sendmonkey**

#### **Snippets from a fun society**

**"Disillusionment with the previous Parliament is causing many people to demand the return to the direct representation system instead of the direct/proportional representation system we have had in place in 2011. Understandable, but reactionary and stupid. It will result in a parliament with no women or Christians, with individual candidates – with no political leadership or direction – who are the most brutal in their on the ground campaigning winning.** Outside of Cairo, this means members of big families or clans who usually "enforce the law" and possibly engage in drug or arms trafficking who will be the representatives of the post-June 30 parliament. Certainly the best people to discuss economic policy and laws governing transparency or freedoms in the critical phase this country is in. Can you see it? Think of the 2012 parliament, only without beards or parties. And before someone says that this didn't happen the days the NDP was in power, well, it's precisely because of that reason. The NDP – powered by the Mubarak state – would enforce its own reality on the candidates running, telling who to run where,



*ensuring that the rank and file would win in areas they would have no chance of winning in, and even that didn't fly for long, with NDP members who weren't chosen would run independently against the NDP official candidates, a phenomenon started in the 2005 elections and compounded in the 2010 one, and you all know that one ended. You want a reprise? Be my guests. It's your funeral"*

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**Wael Nawara**

## **Egypt Needs Proportional Electoral System**

*"All electoral systems have advantages and disadvantages. So we may need to adopt a hybrid system that includes proportional representation for partisan and independents' lists while temporarily allocating a percentage of seats for traditionally marginalized groups. The best solution may be to adopt the proportional list system, but with smaller districts with an added national list, having 10% of seats, for these marginalized groups." [...] "It is also necessary that all political forces are fairly represented in the next parliament in order to pass legislation and reform policies that are not populist in nature. Those necessary decisions may cause some temporary suffering to the people. But it is necessary to reform the dysfunctional economy, the subsidization of energy prices, and the excessive number of government employees, and pass other austerity measures that would require political consensus"*

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## **The Neo-Nationalism**

**Belal Fadl**

### **A Chat With the Mighty Commander**

***"Your desire to control everything will make you lose everything. You will find that an iron fist cannot rule a perseverant generation, which ignores your violations now only to test your limits.*** Trust me, my certainty does not stem from lack of faith in you but from analysis of your actions: For instance, you defamed an [honorable] man with a lisp and a clear stance, who agreed to work with you in hopes that you'd learned from your predecessor's mistakes. When he refused to do as you told, you [tormented] him and sent your followers to attack him. You always talk of your respect for Al-Azhar, but you went over its head and forced it to release a statement disassociating you from the massacre you carried out. The few respectable figures who agreed to work with you in the

government have been terrorized and forced to think very carefully before they decide to take a decent stance on anything. **Amidst all this you are content with the media, which is at your service, without thinking of the price that a society built on hate, violence, anger, vulgarity, accusations and revenge will have to pay"**

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**Bassem Sabry**

### **Understanding Egyptian Nationalism**

"Some will make the argument that nationalisms are ideas and constructs that are destined to wither in favor of more internationalist (or pan-regional), individualist as well as liberal-leaning trends. Others might make the counterargument rather that nationalisms evolve and adapt, and that they are persistent and even resurgent in varying ways within European Union countries. But that is an extended debate. Either way, **the reality is that within Egypt this nationalist wave is the strongest challenger Islamism has ever witnessed in recent history, and the potential of its evolution into a more coherent and evolved ideological structure should not be discounted"**

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**Sarahcarr**

### **Egypt After the Clampdown**

"The Brotherhood roundup and the closure of Islamist media channels, including those with a Brotherhood bias (such as Al-Jazeera Mobasher Misr, the network's Egypt branch), has taken place in almost complete silence and with very little public criticism. The vast majority of the general public, apparently still recovering from its brush with Islamist rule and high on the fascistic nationalism that took hold of public life after the massive anti-Brotherhood demonstrations of June 30, think death would be too good for the Brotherhood. Defense Minister General Abdul-Fattah el-Sisi, who forced Morsi's removal and who as the embodiment of the army and intelligence services is running the country behind a fig leaf of civilian rule, is now a cross between a pinup star and Batman, fighter of the dark forces. Teslam el ayady, or "Bless Your Hands," a jingoistic paean to the armed forces, is now reportedly the most requested song at weddings"

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## Zeinobia

**ElBaradei has become the enemy of #Jan25 and #June30**

**"Ahrām Arabī magazine publishes the blacklists of the 25 January revolution and 30 June revolution enemies and members of the fifth column.** The cover includes a group of photos for public figures; some of them are Muslim brotherhood supporters and some of them are not Muslim brotherhood supporters but rather democracy supporters" [.....] **"In short these names are those who supported the original 25 January revolution and stood against the violations of SCAF.** Of course there are other similar hash tags now on twitter like "The January Setback" as people buy more of the conspiracy talk. **Sadly enough this McCarthyism flourishing in Egypt is forcing to people to rethink their positions and even fear to express their opinions freely online or offline as before for fear of the backlash**" [....] **"All this makes the youth that believes in the revolution disappointed and desperate , their voices are not heard because the people will attack anyone who say anything different.** Some young people I know unfortunately believe that the deep state of Mubarak has won and there is no other option except to leave the country. Of course it is a long road but you can not blame them when all the media whether TV or radio or press or even social media is full of Ultra-nationalism, McCarthyism and old ugly faces from Mubarak's era returning back. People are affected by this extensive propaganda"



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## **The War on Terror: Back to the 50's and 90's**



### Ziad Akl

#### **Manufacturing Fear**

**"In other words, the state managed to confront the terrorism threat of the early 90s, but on the expense of individual freedom, personal liberties, social and religious tolerance and citizenship rights.** Since we are pretty much doing what we used to do and using the very same strategies that we used, it is very likely that we will end up paying the very same cost we paid before" [....] **"Don't be surprised when individual rights and personal freedoms are cracked down upon in the name of national security. Don't be confused when our perceptions are mixed with**



*those extremist stereotypes. As long as we choose the short, lawless road, as long as we crack down on difference rather than understanding it, as long as we remain prisoners of rigid thought and selfish leadership and as long as we allow our own minds to be shaped by boards and bureaus, as long as all that keeps happening, we will lose individuality day by day and move further from what we truly chanted on the streets"*

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**Salamamoussa**

### **It Is Not 1954**

*"Egypt is not the same as 1954. The Egypt of 1954 stood idly while the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), which morphed into the Nasser presidency, arrested a good number of the MB and even executed a few of its members. Today's Egypt is far more mobilized, and although polarized, will likely reject wholesale suppression of any group. Political mobilization in 1954 was still along nationalist lines, the result of 30 years of Wafd politics and the presence of the British in the Suez Canal. This gave the army an advantage over the MB. In Egypt of 2013 mobilization is largely along pro and anti Islamist lines, making the army think twice before initiating a wholesale purge of the MB" [.....] " Having stated the reasons why 2013 is not 1954, let me state one reason that might negate all of the above. The strong hostility that certain sectors of the Egyptian society now have toward the MB, especially after one year of their rule. Some, otherwise sensible people talk of how "Tienanmen Square led to China's economic rise". It is a frightening prospect for Egypt, and one that we hope will not take hold"*

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**Sarahcarr**

### **With or Against Us**

*"It looks like we are heading towards media oppression that will be worse than under 2011. There is a public appetite for it, and the security bodies have apparently been given a green light to do as they please. **Wars on terrorism rely on crude binaries: You are either with us or against us, and this is the constant message being relayed to us. Attempting to steer through the choppy mess that is Egypt at the moment with such a simplistic approach is disastrous, and is intended to reinforce the fiction that there are only two camps in the country.** This is about bolstering the military regime's strength, and its strength is dependent on the creation of an equal and opposing force against*

*which it must pit itself. The Brotherhood has become its raison d'etre: There is no other reason to justify its current position and current actions"*

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**H.A. Hellyer**

### **Egypt's War... Against Whom?**

*"This sort of vocabulary has a direct effect; to nullify the treatment of citizens as citizens and assign them an extraordinary status due to "exceptional circumstances." Sometimes governments do this on their own , sometimes popular sentiment and populist media assist them. That is certainly the case right now in Egypt, **considering the pro-Mursi camp is being described as "non-Egyptian" by swathes of an ultra-nationalist media.** The basis for this is the supra-national commitments expressed by the Muslim Brotherhood's Islamist leaders. The "general guide" of the Muslim Brotherhood famously said: "to heck with Egypt." A few forgave him for that statement, even before the whirlwind of ultra-nationalistic sentiment erupted. Yet, this is hardly enough to deny him, or those who follow him, the right of normal citizenry – otherwise, the Nasserites of Arab nationalism, or the socialists of the "global working class" ought also be questioned over their commitment to the Egyptian nation-state." [...]* ***"There are many criticisms that can, and ought to, be made vis-à-vis the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. However, they ought never to be used to provide excuses for abuses perpetrated by society at large, or by the state in carrying out its duties to protect every Egyptian – pro-Mursi or otherwise. There are few in Egypt who can now stand on the moral high ground – we ought to encourage the growth of their ranks, rather than encouraging people to fail to stand for the best of what Egypt was, and what it could again be"***

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### **Egypt's Flawed Democracy: Uncertain Fate & Repentance**



**Mohamed A. Fouad**

### **Squandered Opportunities**

*"It is great to hope for tomorrow to be a better day; one cannot live otherwise. However, without carefully assessing the mistakes of the past, one is also bound to repeat them. The evidence on the ground suggests that we have a lot of learning to take in. **In a poll conducted by Gallup two weeks before former president Morsi was deposed, 80% of Egyptians interviewed said that their country was worse off than***

*it was when Mubarak has stepped down and 50% believed that their country will still be worse off in five years. Now, if you frankly have to ask the question: Was it all for nothing? Sad as it is, I think you have the answer. Now, do something about"*

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**Salamamoussa**

### **The Brittle State**

*"The goals of the 2011 revolution, Bread-Freedom-Social Justice, are catchy, vague and contradictory. The country needs a chicken in every pot not more poorly-baked and subsidized bread. Only an unfettered market will guarantee that, and such a market will initially run counter to social justice, although it will ultimately strengthen it in profound ways. Freedom is a vague concept, notable only by its absence. What will free Egypt from its current chaos is respect for the rules, which may seem initially counter to "Freedom", but is ultimately its true servant and guardian. Incremental progress, not revolutionary action, may guarantee the most profound change in Egypt today. **The only open question is whether Egypt will be lucky enough to find leaders who can articulate this vision to its people in terms both understandable and respectful. It would run counter to the last decades of leadership, which has been alternately charismatic , theatrical , tedious , and stupid, but rarely effective"***

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**Nervana Mahmoud**

### **Egypt's New Political Map**

*"There is a new line of demarcation that has started to make a distinction between Militarism and Mubarakism in Egypt's political sphere. Indeed, Mubarak was an army man, but his long tenure was associated with a subtle shift towards favoring the police and business elite, while sidelining or neutralizing charismatic military figures such as Gamasi and Abu-Ghazala, whom he feared could appeal to the public and challenge his rule" [...]* ***"If we are not careful, the future of Egypt may be in the form of neo-nationalism: a mixture of militarism, socialism, and non-Muslim Brotherhood's Islamism, all mixed together in a parcel that is wrapped with only a thin wrap of flawed democracy, in which the junta are leading from behind"***

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### **Bassem Sabry**

#### **The Uncertain Fate Of Egypt's Political Parties**

*"**Islamist parties** are primarily challenged with survival by a post-June 30 environment hostile to them and therefore might find themselves, at the least, legally forced to amend their platforms if the new constitution bans religious parties. Assuming involvement in upcoming elections, they will have to move to lock in their voter bases, followed by certain-to-be difficult attempts to appeal to independent voters and repair damaged public images, especially given the absence of a sympathetic local mass media. **Finding fresh representative faces would go a long way. They should, as much as possible, minimize direct confrontation** with the new administration and the security establishment. **Secular-leaning parties have little option but to merge into fewer but more significant organizations, pooling resources and capacities while refining their rhetoric and programs. They too need fresh faces without political baggage** who can rouse excitement "*

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### **H.A. Hellyer**

#### **Elites are to blame for Egypt's failed political structure**

*"The dynamism of Egyptian political public life has taken blow after blow since March 2011. Will that dynamism return? Will the revolution recover? In many ways the situation now is harder than it was three years ago, when Mr Mubarak ruled. Yet, just as his system was unsustainable, so ultimately is any system that does not meet the demands of the Egyptian people. If those who control the new order wish to remain in control, sooner or later they may have to adjust to meet those demands. If they do not, there is likely to be consequences. **The question is not if the revolution will recover, but how long any Egyptian state can hope to survive with stability, if it does not uphold the dignity of citizens**"*

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## Theatre of The Absurd in Lebanon



### Moulahazat

#### Lebanon, Or The Mailbox

*"In 48 hours of chaos, hundreds of Syrians die due to a chemical attack, a Palestinian group launches rockets on Israel's Naharaya, Israel responds by raiding a Palestinian camp on Lebanese territory, while later that day two car bombs target mosques in Tripoli. A week earlier, another bomb (courtesy of a Syrian opposition group) rocks the southern suburb of Beirut, just after a week of a Hezbollah-Israeli clash that was followed by days of silence. For a republic where the political status quo is still the same since March, things are moving a little too fast on the security side.*



*As you can see from the small intro above, **Lebanon is practically non-existent in Lebanon. It's all about Syrians, Israelis and Palestinians. The only thing in common between every one of them is the Lebanese soil, where they apparently like to send each other messages.** Lebanon is not only the mailbox linking the Syrians and Israelis, but also the one linking the Syrian themselves. The opposition and the regime, along with their Lebanese allies, are sending each other messages in an **accelerating rhythm**. No one is making a sufficient remarkable breakthrough on the ground in Syria, which made both sides in a need of a psychological warfare in every possible location. Perhaps intimidating the population, targeting its beliefs, and demoralizing it might eventually lead to questioning the power of both sides among their supporters, and helping to shatter the military front from the opposite side"*

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## Mustapha Hamoui

### **In Praise of Security Theater**

"Security theater is important for people to be able to live normal lives. People who believe that security is being taken care of –even if it's an illusion– will behave more rationally and more in line with their actual odds of being hurt by terrorist attacks. Even Scheiner himself, the man who invented the term "security theater", came around to seeing its value: "delivering the perception of improved security may be a practical job requirement [for security professionals]" he admitted. **Wherever you look in Lebanon, you see security theater. Sometimes you don't even recognize that it's security theatre.** The day after the explosions in Tripoli, many army tanks roamed the streets of the capital of the north and made a thundering background noise heard all across the place. **The tanks were not meant to increase security (how can rolling tanks discover booby-trapped cars?), but they achieved their objective perfectly: They soothed the frayed nerves of scared and wary citizens"**



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## Sami Nader

### **Lebanon as 'Theater of Surprise' In Syria War**

"Even though Syria will be the theater of military operations this time if Congress approves a strike, the confrontation theater may yet expand and turn Lebanon into a theater of surprises. Lebanon, in addition to being a breeding ground for security operations in various forms because of its weak central government and army, also remains Hezbollah's headquarters and the launching point for war with Israel" [.....] "Those concerns were indirectly expressed by Druze leader Walid Jumblatt, who fears that a military strike on Syria may turn Lebanon into a launching pad to repel the US aggression, especially since Lebanon is the weakest link and that Congress's mandate doesn't allow for military action inside Lebanon. So the Lebanese arena remains the weak underbelly of the coalition forces — unless another party that is not shackled by congressional authorization gets involved"

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## The Main Victims of Hizbollah's policy: The Shiites



Michael Young

**Hizbollah is losing on several fronts as it clings to its patrons**

*"Nor will the aftermath in Syria necessarily benefit the party. A messy outcome there will hardly ensure a stable Lebanon, **while Hizbollah is keen to avoid domestic instability. If Mr Al Assad triumphs, the party will have to manage Sunni discontent; if he loses, Hizbollah will have to absorb the downfall of a major backer, a strategic defeat for both the party and Iran.** When all its props in society go, Hizbollah will still have its weapons to silence its adversaries. **But intimidation can only make matters worse at a time when many Lebanese are doubting Hizbollah's choices. The party cannot long survive in an unreceptive environment, which could turn hostile before long**"*

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Hanin Ghaddar

**The collective suicide of the Shiites**

*"You've known your enemy for years: Israel. It was clear, during the war with Israel, you hide or escape; otherwise you are rather safe. Today, your enemy is like a ghost. **You cannot identify it or understand where it is coming from. They tell you it is Syrian takfiris or Islamists who want to kill you just because you're a Shiite. You don't really want to believe it because you have been told for years that your enemy is Israel.** What happened now? But you do eventually believe it because you also hear these fanatics threatening your community day after day on TV and YouTube videos. You're surrounded by hatred, loathing, and poisonous rhetoric every day. No one is helping you out of this nightmare. No one wants you to get out. You feel everyone prefers you stay in there because it makes it easier for them to pour their blame and sectarian hatred on you. You will stay the punching bag for a very long time. **If the US strikes Syria and the regime eventually falls, you will be the victim of all revenge attempts and you will have to pay a bigger price, because you are considered a Hezbollah supporter. If they don't strike,***



*extremism will be emboldened and you will also have to pay the price, because you are a Shiite"*

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## Syria



### The Egyptian Angle: First Come Syria Then Come Egypt....

Nervana Mahmoud

#### Egypt Debates US Strike on Syria

*"Egyptian analysts have been marketing an intriguing idea that stems mainly from their anti-American stance: Once Assad's regime collapses, Egypt will be next on the hit list. They are convinced that the United States strongly backed the Morsi regime and that army chief Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi has ruined American interests in the Middle East by his move against Morsi. Therefore, the United States is bound to take retaliatory measures, but only after finishing off Syria and Iran, which are higher on its list of priorities. The thought of this is simply wild, but sadly, many Egyptians find it plausible"*

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Arabist

#### Syria as seen in Egypt by Nour Youssef

*"Some for the reasons Amr Hamzawy offered Adeeb, which were, to be brief: It is dangerous to allow the US to fashion itself as an international "Rambo" conducting military operations without international consent - again; there are no happy post-military intervention examples in living memory to cite in order to make the case for Syria, which needs a political solution, regionally and internationally, and; one of the main goals of Jan 25 was to end Egypt's subordination to the US, which should afford it the right to oppose the US when it disagrees with it" [...]. "Hamdeen Sabahi, for example, tweeted that history teaches us that an attack on Egypt always began with an attack on Syria, hence the need to oppose this barbarism" [...] "Kardy Saeed thought the main reason why Egypt shouldn't condone an attack on Syria was because it would open the door for an attack on Egypt. Amr*

Adeeb screamed at a colorful map of a divided Syria and then moved on to compare between our Qatari and Emirati brothers, **while others saw the attack as a US consolation prize to the MB for failing to tame Gen. Abdel Fattah el-Sisi**"

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**H.A. Hellyer**

### **Syria**

"I am uncertain that these limited military strikes will have the desired effect, and I am unsure that there are no other courses of action that could be taken, if by different actors in the international community. But what **I do have absolute certainty of, is that doing nothing is not a solution , and that the lives of more than a 100,000 Syrians, as well as the destruction of that beautiful country, is a shame upon the very concept of the 'international community'**. If the British anti-interventionist left, and all those around who now oppose military strikes had been be so energetic about trying to enact solutions for Syria over the last three years, perhaps there would be no need to mourn the deaths of so many now. Give the people of Syria a better choice than one type of madness over another"

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## **The Turkish Angle: Public Opinion & Border Insecurity**



**Verda Ozer**

### **Victory of public opinion in Syria**

"Syria has unleashed questions about the legitimacy of leaders to make unilateral decisions about interventions, in wider terms about policy. Politicians now know that domestic and global public opinion is hanging over their heads like the sword of Damocles. Public opinion has become the 5th power in addition to the legislative, judicial and executive branches of governance and the media usually considered to be the fourth power. With the help of the internet and a globalizing world, every individual has become a pressure group in himself, achieving as much leverage as a state. Nation states have to accept this new reality and shape their policies accordingly. And Turkey is no exception to that. Prime Minister Erdoğan argues there is no need for a parliamentary authorization to participate in an intervention, pointing at the still-effective bill adopted on Syria last year enabling the Turkish military to intervene. **Even if Erdoğan's argument were**

***legally correct, the new facts on the ground require him to consult with the Parliament, the sole representative of the people. If there is any winner in the Syria debate, it is certainly the “public opinion”***

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**Amberin Zaman**

### **Turkey's Syria Border on Edge**

*"There are numerous occasions where authorities get inside tips to stop trucks or vehicles carrying explosives, guns and ammunition. There are many in the state structure who understand how wrong it is to yield to radical groups like this. We're not really talking about innocent refugees here. No one can ever have a problem with them here. **"The problem here is this. If you take all these incidents as being separate from each other, you don't see the full picture. But when you start looking at all these incidents as being linked to each other, and that there is an organization behind it, then you have to also treat this differently under the law.** These people are openly taking action against the safety and security of the Turkish state, and we're letting them go free. **We're suspending the rule of law to topple the Assad regime, but at a cost of putting the lives of our people here at risk."***

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### **The Lebanese Angle: "When Syria Sneezes, Lebanon Catches a Cold"**



**Moulahazat**

### **The Tomahawk Effect on Lebanon**

*"The Berri/Hezbollah Political Stances. **When a Lebanese Zai'm who was for decades Syria's man in Lebanon is expected to abandon his affiliation with the pro-syrian M8 alliance and side in the middle, you know that everyone is trying to be a centrist in times of turmoil.** Hezbollah's silence is the most remarkable one on the matter. The party fighting along the regime on Syrian soil didn't yet mention what its response will be on an American intervention and is probably considering all his options"*

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## Michael Karam

### **When Syria sneezes, Lebanon catches a cold**

*"On 14 August a car bomb exploded in the Shia Beirut suburb of Rwais, killing 24 people — most likely a message from the Syrian opposition to Hezbollah. It was the biggest blast in over 20 years in terms of casualties, but the record didn't stand for long. One week later, a blast ripped apart two Sunni mosques in Tripoli killing more than 50 worshippers and bystanders. Game on. **The Lebanese know all too well that the Syrian civil war won't be slowed down by any limited military strike. They know this is not an uprising against an outdated ruling class. It is a religious conflict drenched in centuries of hatred that threatens to engulf poor neighbouring Lebanon**"*

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## **The Faces behind the Syrian Opposition**

### Hassan Hassan

#### **Who Is Ali Habib? Syria's Highest-Ranking Military Defector**



***"The general was an old friend to the Saudis since he led the Syrian troops that participated in the US-led military action against Saddam Hussain to liberate Kuwait in 1991. He is said to be a personal friend of Bandar bin Sultan, the Saudi intelligence chief since July 2012 (he assumed that role reportedly to handle the Syrian dossier). According to media reports, during the meeting between Prince Bandar and Vladimir Putin a few weeks ago, General Habib's name was dropped. The reports claim that Prince Bandar suggested General Habib represent the Alawites in a Sunni-Alawite transition plan. The reports say no agreement was reached. General Habib is a salvageable regime figure. His ties to the Russians, as a member of the regime, together with his ties to the Saudis and the Americans make him an acceptable candidate to bolster the opposition's status. Previously, Manaf Tlas was proposed to take such a role but Tlas is unacceptable to many especially conservative Syrians who think he was a "womanizer" and corrupt"***

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## Ahmed Jarba: we will block arms from extremists because they will kill us if we don't

*"I am a member of the Democratic Bloc, led by Michel Kilo. When the Bloc chose me, neither the Qataris nor the Saudis knew that. I have allies among the FSA [ranks], revolutionary forces and even the Muslim Brotherhood. The Brotherhood, who are supposed to be allies to Qatar, their votes were in my favour and my deputy is Farouq Tayfour [the Brotherhood's deputy leader]. In fact, the Brotherhood have more representation in the Coalition's political bureau than before". "I have been close to the FSA and I was one of the early ones to support fighters and militarise the revolution. So my backing by the FSA got me here"*



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## Jordan

### Syrian Refugees' Burden on Jordan



Deema Alam Farraj

#### The Untold Story

***"Zatari camp, this camp now has around 120000 thousand refugees. It has become the 4th bigger Jordanian city in terms of population. This has become a major issue and a major threat to Jordan and Jordanians" [.....] "What is not well publicized is that 70% of the refugees are living within the Jordanian community and not refugee camps. This is causing a lot of discontent among Jordanians as many Syrians have been getting their jobs for less salaries. In a country with a high unemployment rate that is just starting to recover from the deleterious effects of the Arab spring that has swept all around it, many of the scarce jobs that were available in Jordan are now out of reach for Jordanians. The government is being asked to be more restrictive regarding this issue but as the US people know only too well, this is very hard to control"***



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### Nikita Malik

#### **A Border That Breaks: Jordan as the Alternative Homeland**

*"When Syria's civil war began, many Jordanian families opened their doors to refugees. Interviews I conducted with UNHCR aid workers placed in the Zaatari camp in mid July revealed that Jordanians saw themselves as "hosts of countries where they have wars." And according to Jordanian elites, the needed stability decreased the likelihood of war happening at home. But **the inflow has been so much larger than expected that relations between the new arrivals and host population have become strained. This has important implications for the durability of Jordan's current monarchy. The 'Hashemite strategy' has never been a simple matter of divide and rule, but rather, of pluralism and inclusion of different identity groups. This is bolstered by fear of Jordan becoming al-watan al-badil, or the alternative homeland**" [...]* "Quite simply, refugees have changed the political climate in Jordan, vis-à-vis the state's ability to absorb, detain, or deflect them"

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### Impatient Bedouin

#### **Are Syrian Children Being Denied Entry into Jordan?**

*"The decision to turn away child refugees is deplorable, but admitting more refugees when the pace of aid is unclear is indeed going to further strain Jordan's resources. Families with young children must be allowed to escape the conflict, but more recognition is required of the strains on Jordan and indeed other neighboring states that the conflict in Syria has caused. **Perhaps the real issue is not really the presence of refugees themselves but rather the fact that most of the parties supporting either side in this conflict are participating for real or perceived strategic advantage, while shifting most of the harm of the conflict onto neighboring states such as Jordan**"*

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